The head of this Moscow exarchate in Ukraine, Metropolitan Onufriy, is seated in the middle of the front row. Vladimir Putin and Moscow Patriarch Kirill presiding over a meeting with the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on Jin Kyiv, Ukraine, less than a year before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas. In the Luhansk diocese, for example, the Church’s collaboration with the separatists included the chaplain blessing the troops, the consecration of monuments, the erection of crosses to “the victims of Ukrainian aggression ,” the performance of oaths, and direct collaboration with the authorities in public events and actions ( Religion.in.ua, February 3, 2018). Moreover, some UOC-MP priests and parishes have actively or passively supported the Moscow-backed separatist efforts in the Donbas territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. Support for the Cossacks explicitly comes from the Russian Church’s exarchate in Ukraine-the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (henceforth, UOC-MP)-and includes mundane logistics help as well as ideological backing, such as blessing Russian Cossack organizations. The Cossacks’ historical links with the Russian Orthodox Church have likewise been an important bridgehead for the Kremlin into Ukraine’s occupied territories. Although some make the claim that the lands of Luhansk Oblast were formerly (until 1917) part of the Don Cossack Host, there is little sign this is currently being put forward as a serious assertion or ideological justification for any kind of action. Russia also used the Don Cossacks to help occupy parts of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014. This heightened activity around the Cossack structures inside Russia is a plausible indicator of potential planned future ventures by the Kremlin (see EDM, March 18).Ĭossacks have been a central component of Moscow’s aggressive activities on Ukrainian territory, with the Kuban Cossacks playing a pivotal role in the annexation of Crimea. Moreover, at the end of 2019, President Vladimir Putin signed into law a bill that further centralizes the state-supported (“registered”) Russian Cossack movement and creates an All-Russian Cossack Society as a layer of bureaucracy over the hitherto regional Cossack organizations (, November 5, 2019). Tellingly, Prokopov has a history of, until 2012, overseeing border guard cooperation with the Kuban Cossack Host, when he headed the Tymoshevsk Black Sea–Azov branch of the FSB Coast Guard ( Radio Svoboda, March 26). For instance, Dmitry Prokopov was named chief of the Federal Security Service for Belgorod and Voronezh oblasts in August 2018-just prior to a law coming into effect calling for “volunteers” to help police these regions’ borders with Ukraine. Of particular note has been the various evidence of Russian special services links to these newly deployed Cossack groups. Given Moscow’s previous use of Cossack forces in the Donbas conflict and the annexation of Crimea, recent reports that new Cossack structures were created in the regions bordering Ukraine’s Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernhiv oblasts raised understandable alarms (see Moscow creates new ‘Cossack’ paramilitary units for possible use against Ukraine, April 9). This activism, combined with most international governments’ strong preoccupation with evolving disease outbreaks in their own countries, have raised fears that Russia might additionally try to use this opportunity to aggressively act on various territorial claims beyond its borders, perhaps to distract from domestic criticism. For as long as official cases of COVID-19 have remained manageable inside the Russian Federation, Moscow was able to exploit the global coronavirus pandemic to try to pursue various foreign policy goals (see EDM, April 13).
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